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Article 5

THE INFORMATION GAP IN ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
Kirkley S. Coulter*
In a series of cases culminating in the decision of United States
v. Von's Grocery Co. in May, 1966,' the Supreme Court seems to
have embraced a more and more rigidly mathematical approach to
the enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 1950.2
In this case no misbehavior on the part of the defendant (or of
anyone else) was charged. The attack went, not to conduct, but
solely to industry structure. The illegality was found by the court
to rest heavily on certain statistical trends which it believed constituted an increase in "economic concentration" in the Los Angeles
grocery market.
The Celler-Kefauver Act amended Section seven of the Clayton Act so as to make it read in relevant part as follows:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital... of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
for any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly." s
As can be seen, the section deals only with mergers. It does
not touch any other aspect of the antitrust laws. However, the
enforcement actions being brought against mergers under this section are in fact the cutting edge of current government antitrust
policy. The new line of enforcement, with its sharp focus on the
purely statistical aspects, makes severe calls on such statistical data
and economic expertise as can be brought to bear.
First, a review of the decision. In 1960 Von's Grocery Company, a locally-owned Los Angeles grocery chain, undertook to acquire by merger another local Los Angeles grocery chain, Shopping Bag Food Stores. Both firms were major factors in the retail
grocery business in the market comprising Los Angeles and its
suburbs. Von's ranked third in sales volume among grocery chains
in the area and Shopping Bag sixth, with combined sales aggregating 7.5 percent of the total retail grocery sales of the market.
*

Minority Economist, Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee.

384 U.S. 270 (1965).
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
3 Id.
'
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Delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Black emphasized heavily the decline which had occurred during recent years in the number of owners operating a single retail grocery store in the Los

Angeles market. From 5,365 in 1950, the number of such stores
had decreased to 3,818 in 1961 and to 3,590 in 1963. 4 This decline
was taken by Justice Black to constitute an increase in economic
concentration. In fact, in a footnote to the opinion he created a
virtual definition of the concept of rising concentration in just
those terms, as "a total decrease in the number of separate competitors .... -5

Next, Justice Black pointed to the number of recent acquisitions and mergers among other grocery chains in the Los Angeles
market, particularly to previous acquisitions by some of the larger
firms (although neither Von's nor Shopping Bag had previously
merged with any of their competitors). The merger of Von's and
Shopping Bag occurred against this background.
These facts were, he said, "alone... enough to cause us to conclude that the Von's-Shopping Bag merger did violate [section]
7," 6 for the basic purpose of the 1950 Act was "to prevent economic
concentration in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business.17 The economy was believed
to be characterized by "a rising tide of economic concentration."8
Congress intended to preserve competition by arresting this supposed trend toward concentration "in its incipiency."9 The facts of
the Von's Grocery case presented "exactly the threatening trend
toward concentration which Congress wanted to halt," according
to Justice Black.10
Some have treated the Von's Grocery decision as if it broke
radically new ground. Indeed, in his dissent in this case Justice
Stewart argued that the majority's opinion was "contrary not only
to our previous decisions, but contrary to the language of [section]
7, contrary to the legislative history of the 1950 amendment, and
contrary to economic reality."" It was, he said scornfully, "a
simple exercise in sums," which disregard "the economic concentration of the market, the level of competition in the market, or
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1965).
5 Id. at 273 n.3.
6 Id. at 274.
7 Id. at 275.
8 Id. at 276.
4

9 Id. at 277.
10 Id.

11 Id. at 283 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the potential adverse effects of the merger on that competition.'

2

True, in its heavy reliance on the simple datum of a decline in
the number of grocery firms, Von's Grocery went considerably beyond any previous holding by the high Court. Yet much of this
approach was foreshadowed as long ago as 1962, in Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,'5 which forbade the merger of Brown Shoe Company, a manufacturer with
some retail outlets, and G. R. Kinney, primarily a retail shoe chain.
In that opinion the Chief Justice, not once but twice, referred to
the "rising tide of concentration" that he thought was occurring
throughout the economy. The opinion also referred to the decline
which had occurred in the number of shoe manufacturing companies, although the decision was not made to rest specifically on
that fact. However, the opinion did object directly to the fact that
in some individual towns and cities, Brown, by adding the Kinney
retail outlets to its own, would come into control of what the court
considered too great a share of the retail market in those various
towns and cities. "If a merger achieving 5% control (of the retail
sales in a city) were now approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar
market shares," 14 the Court said.
The significance of the Von's Grocery decision is pointed up by
the fact that the Federal Trade Commission has moved to implement it by announcing broad guidelines as to what scale of mergers
in the food distribution industry are permissible in the Commission's eyes. 15 Mergers by grocery chains involving annual sales of
over 500 million dollars "raise sufficient questions regarding their
legal status to warrant attention and consideration by the Commission.... ." and likewise for voluntary and cooperative groups doing
a comparable volume of business in the food field.1 6 Those with
annual sales of between 100 and 500 million dollars raise less question unless they involve competitive overlap in particular local
markets, but even so they will be subject to semi-automatic commission investigation.
In an unprecedented move the commission also imposed a requirement for a pre-merger notification to itself by any company
Id. at 282-83 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
370 U.S. 294 (1961).
14 Id. at 343-44.
15 "Enforcement Policy with respect to Mergers in the Food Distribution
Industries," announcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 1 TRADE
REG. REP. fT4520 (1967).
12

13

16

Id.
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fitting any of the above specifications, such notification to be given
sixty days prior to the consummation of a projected merger acqui17
sition.
This writer is an economist, not a lawyer. In these and other
decisions it is apparent that the Court has been operating on the
basis of certain premises regarding trends and developments believed to characterize the nation's economic structure. Evidently
the Court's decisions have been powerfully shaped by these premises.

Some of these premises appear to be the following:
1. The American competitive system ought to be, so far as possible, comprised of numerous, principally small producers in each
industry or line of commerce.
2. During the present period the economy is characterized by
a "rising tide of economic concentration."
3. In this context, the definition of increased economic concentration is simply a decline in the number of firms.
4. This assumed trend toward concentration has been caused at
least partly by the large number of mergers among corporations;
although the court has nowhere said so, presumably it must be bebelieved that blocking the mergers will check the trend toward
concentration, if such a trend exists.

To what degree do these premises accurately reflect the factual
situation? Clearly some of them are value judgments, not susceptible to proof or testing. For the most part, however, they are
based on statistical data or economic reasoning. A true judgment,
based on facts rather than emotion or prior ideological leanings,
should be possible in some cases.
During the past three years the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has engaged in a
rather extensive study of the general topic of economic concentration in several of its aspects. Five substantial volumes of hearings have been compiled. 18 In addition, there have been made
available voluminous statistical tabulations prepared by the United
States Census Bureau, which have attempted to define the extent
17 Id.
18 At this writing four of the volumes have been published as Hearings on

Economic ConcentrationwBeforethe Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., and
89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. 1-4 (1964 & 1965). The fifth volume will
appear shortly. See also REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMiV.

ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE

ON THE JuDIcIARY, 89th Cong., 2d
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1963, Pt. 1

Covnm.

inafter cited as REPORT

OF

Sess., CoNcENTATIOx RATIOS
(Comm. Print 1966). [Here-

mE CENSUS BUREAU].
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of concentration found to exist in the various manufacturing industries. Despite such laborious delving, most of the questions relating to this topic remain unanswered, understandably so. Yet the
facts permit categorical conclusions on some points.
To begin with, among experts and students in this field there
is now substantial agreement on exactly what is meant by the
term "economic concentration." It relates to the situation in which
a large share of an industry (or of a market for a product or group of
products) is controlled by a limited number of firms. Let us pick
an example at random. According to the Census Bureau, of the
total value of shipments in 1963 by the industry designated "organic fibers, noncellulosic" (SIC 2824), ninety-four percent was
shipped by the four largest companies in the industry. If the calculation is extended to include the eight largest companies these
eight accounted for ninety-nine percent; the twenty largest companies accounted for 100 percent of the total. These percentage
figures are referred to as the four-firm, eight-firm, or twenty-firm
"concentration ratios" respectively for the industry. 9
From such a high figure of concentration, four-firm concentration ratios range all the way down to such levels as thirty-one percent for meat slaughtering plants (SIC 2011) ,20 eleven percent for
logging camps and contractors (SIC 2411) ,21 and five percent for
fur goods (SIC 2371) .22
It is unfortunate that in his decision in Von's Grocery, Justice
Black chose to focus his argument on the mere number of grocery
firms. In so doing he revealed his own economic predilections
rather than any useful analysis of the realities of economic competition. If several thousand small food stores are replaced by several
hundred grocery supermarkets in Los Angeles or anywhere else,
it does not indicate any lessening of competition, which may become more vigorous than ever. As well might it be argued that
farming is becoming a concentrated industry on the ground that
the number of farms in the United States has declined from
7,000,000 in 1935 to 3,300,000 today.
A larger business unit in both food retailing and farming has
come to predominate because of the movement of vast economic
19 Under some circumstances the measurement may be made, not in terms
of value of shipments, but in terms of the percentage of "value added
by manufacture," or of employment, total assets, or some other measure of size. REPORT OF THE CENsus BuREAu, supra note 18, at 81.
21

Id. at 42.
Id. at 66.

22

Id. at 63.

20
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forces, but that does not mean that competition has become any
less vigorous. Justice Black seeks to halt the supermarket revolution by judicial fiat, but as a matter of fact it was not the chains
which accomplished the displacement of the Mom and Pop corner
groceries. It was the independent grocers who led the way in establishing supermarkets and thereby displaced their fellow independents who operated smaller stores. If the Justice could block
all the mergers, and dissolve all the chains, even by that means he
could not resurrect the multitude of tiny stores that have passed
away.
The definition of concentration, then, is not based on mere
number of firms. As noted above, for the specialists in this
field the term relates to percentage share controlled by a few
firms, in other words, to a concentration ratio. The overwhelming preponderance of this view is reflected in the pages of the hearings held by the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Numerous witnesses, lawyers, and other experts as well as economists, testified on economic concentration, its causes and results, its significance, the discernible trends. They represented the entire spectrum of political, economic, and legal views on this topic. Not
one stressed the decline in mere numbers of firms as a measure of
concentration; in fact, so far as I can recall, none even mentioned it
at all.
The difference in concept is crucial. A reduction in the number of firms has no relationship to the question of concentration,
unless so few are left that the market comes under some form of
control. If the market for any product falls under the domination
of a limited number of firms, the danger is that they may consciously or unconsciously fall into practices inconsistent with free
competition. Even absent any conspiracy to restrain trade by fixing prices or the like, there may still be at least a possibility that
the few powerful firms will refrain from energetic competitive
tactics to avoid inviting retaliation or otherwise "spoiling the market." But clearly this danger will not arise merely because of a
decline in numbers of competitors, provided only that a sufficient
number remain.
In his opinion in Brown Shoe, Chief Justice Warren made
particular reference to a "rising tide of economic concentration"
which he considered to be under way at this time. This phrase in
the Warren opinion was quoted with approval by Justice Black in
Von's Grocery.23 It is apparent that this idea-that American
23

United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1965), citing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1961).
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markets and industries are falling more and more under concentrated control, which must be checked somehow-has underlaid the
Court's philosophy in recent years, and explains much about some
of its decisions.
Now, the interesting fact is that the data completely fails to
support this belief. In fact, the statistics strongly indicate that
there has been no trend whatever, either upward or downward, in
industry concentration generally. 4 This statement is based on
analysis of data prepared for the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee by the Census Bureau, consisting of concentration ratios
for the various manufacturing industries according to the Standard
Industrial Classification for each of the years 1947, 1954, 1958, and
1963. The calculations for 1963 have been available only since last
fall (1966).
It must be explained that for many industries no comparison
is possible between two different years, because of a change in the
definition of the industry between the two dates. Of the 416 manufacturing industries identified in 1963, a comparison could be made
with 1947 (in a few cases, only with 1954) in somewhat over half
the industries.
The data can be analyzed in various ways. One method is
shown in Table I. Table I presents a simple tabulation showing
the number of industries of which the four-firm concentration ratio
(that is, the share of total shipments of the industry accounted for
by the four largest companies) fell within the percentage brackets
shown in the table. For example, the table shows that for 1947
there were twenty of the 219 industries in which the four largest
firms accounted for eighty percent or more of total shipments,
while for 1963 this was the case for only seventeen of the same industries.

24

In this portion of the discussion attention is focused on "industry concentration," that is, the degree of concentration in the various industries, each taken separately. It is this concept which has to do with
the possible danger of controlled markets and monopolization. A
somewhat unrelated concept sometimes termed "overall concentration,"
having to do with the percentage share in the total national economy
occupied by the 50, 100, 200, etc. largest corporations, is dealt with in
passing at the conclusion of this paper.
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Table 1.25

Number of Industries having Four-firm Concentration Ratios within
Specified Percentage Brackeis, 1963 compared with 1947
Percentage of
Concentration

Number of Industries

Number of Industries
Cumulative

80-100
70-79
60-69
50-59

1947
20
13
14
28

1963
17
13
18
28

1947
20
33
47
75

40-49

26

19

30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

31
42
31
14

101

95

44
37
34
9

132
174
205
219

139
176
210
219

1963
17
30
48
76

It should be noted that the same industries are included in
both years; all industries for which a comparison between 1947
and 1963 is shown in the source were included in the tabulation.
If for a particular industry the concentration ratio for 1947 was
lacking but the ratio for 1954 was available, the latter was used
instead. For a number of the industries value added by manufacture was used rather than value of shipments because the latter
contained a substantial and unmeasurable amount of duplication.
For a few industries value of production was used rather than
value of shipments. In any case, the source was followed each
time.
For a few industries the concentration ratio had been withheld by the Census Bureau to avoid disclosing figures for individual companies. Since practically all of such industries were in
the higher concentration ranges, their omission might have seriously misrepresented the profile by understating the number of
industries in such higher ranges. For that reason estimates based
on information believed to be reliable were made of concentration
ratios as follows:
26
2814 Cyclic (coaltar) crudes, 1963-80-100 percent
27
2822 Synthetic rubber, 1947-80-100 percent 28
3334 Primary aluminum, 1963-80-100 percent
3492 Safes and vaults, 1963-80-100 percent 2 9
3636 Sewing machines, 1963-80-100 percent30
3723 Aircraft propellers and parts, 1963-80-100 percent$'
For two industries, primary lead and dolls, on which the Census Bureau withheld the figures because of the disclosure rule, no
REPORT Op
Id. at 79.
27 Id. at 81.
28 Id. at 98.
29 Id. at 105.
80 Id. at 118.
3' Id. at 124.

25

26

THE

CENsus BUREAu, supra note 18, at 6-41.
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possible and they have been omitted from the above
estimate was
32
tabulation.

Evidently the changes which have occurred in the profile
as a whole over the entire sixteen-year period have not been
great. The overall picture is one of relative stability, with any increases having apparently been offset by an equal or greater number of decreases. There has been some decline in the number of
highly-concentrated industries (eighty to one hundred percent), but
also a decrease in the number of less-concentrated ones (under
twenty percent), with a resulting slight "bunching" in the middle
brackets. However, on the whole the changes have not been great
or particularly significant.
Table II presents a tabulation of the changes, industry by industry, over the 16-year period. Again it can be seen that there
has been no marked trend, either upward or downward. Of the
215 industries for which comparison can be made, an increase in
the four-firm concentration ratio occurred in 103 industries, a decrease in exactly 100 industries. It is practically a tie ball game.
Similarly, when the minor changes (less than five percentage
points) are excluded, there still remain practically equal numbers
of increases and decreases, sixty-eight and sixty-four.
TABLE 11.33
Number of industries having increases and decreases in four-firm
concentration ratio based on value of shipments, 1947-63,
by industry grouping
Total
Number

Change In concentration ratio, 1947-63
Number with
Number with
decreases
increases

of
Industries

5
No
Less
Less
5
percent than change than percent
5 percent or more
or more 5 percent

Industry grouping

Total
Food and kindred products

Tobacco manufactures
Textile mill products
Apparel and related products
Lumber and wood products

Furniture and fixtures

215

68

35

26

12

4

4
14
21
5

6

Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products

3
10
15

Rubber and plastic products,
n.e.c.
Leather and leather products

2
6

82 Id. at 97, 130.
as Id. at 6-41.

1
5
6

5

-

2
-

1

5
7

1

-

1
1

-

-

2

-

1

-

1
1
2

3
1

12

2

36

64

4

6

-

1
1
3
1

1
2
-

-

1

-

-

2

5
2

1
-

1

-

2
2
3
4
2
3

7
1

1

2
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Stone, clay and glass products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Machinery
Electrical machinery
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Miscellaneous manufacturing

16
8
12
13
13
9
5
22

6
3
2
3
3
4
2
11

-

3
1
1
2
1
1
1

-

639
1
2

4
-

1
1
1
-

1

-

2
5
3
1
1

2
2
8
3
4
2
1
9

All industries were included for which a comparison was possible between 1947 and 1963 or lacking that, between 1954 and
1963. Industries included are the same as those for Table I, except in four cases where the lack of data because of the disclosure
rule prevented a comparison.
For the information of the reader the breakdown is presented
by major industry groups. It is interesting to note, for example,
that in the chemical and allied products group, decreases in the
four-firm concentration ratio occurred in twelve industries, in
seven of them by five percentage points or more, as compared with
only three increases in this group. By contrast, among the apparel
and related products industries there were increases in thirteen
industries and decreases in only six.
Evidently this table likewise demonstrates the absence of any
strongly marked trend, either upward or downward. What is also
interesting to note is the considerable number of substantial
changes, both upward and downward, in individual industries.
For almost two-thirds of the industries there have been changes
of five percentage points or more, either upward or downward.
Although the profile as a whole has maintained approximately the
same height, the peaks and valleys within that general profile
have moved substantially in some cases. Evidently the picture is
one of considerable diversity and flexibility within the economic
system, showing that the various industries have great capacity
for adjustment to changing conditions.
Since principal interest is sometimes focused on the more concentrated industries, Table III presents a listing of all those showing a four-firm concentration ratio of seventy-five percent or more
in any one of the four years for which data are available. Of the
twenty-nine industries included in the list, eighteen showed a
smaller concentration ratio in 1963, while only ten showed an increase. Furthermore, by 1963 only seventeen or eighteen had
concentration ratios of seventy-five or more, whereas in 1947 at
least twenty-one (and probably more) had fallen in that bracket.
In many cases these declines in concentration were substantial. The share of the largest four cigarette producers fell from
ninety to eighty percent. For the distilled liquor industry, the per-

640

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 3 (1967)

centage share declined from seventy-five to fifty-eight. For tobacco stemming and redrying, the ratio declined from eighty-eight
to seventy; for pressed and molded pulp goods, from eighty-six to
seventy-two; for industrial gases, from eighty-three to seventytwo; for rubber footwear, from eighty-one to sixty-two; for phonograph records, from seventy-nine to sixty-nine. Of the industries showing increased concentration ratios, in only four cases
did the increase amount to ten percentage points or more: chewing gum, household laundry equipment, primary batteries, and
motor vehicles.
These declines in concentration in a majority of the highly
concentrated industries doubtless will come as a surprise to some.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that in no case were these declines caused by governmental action of an antitrust nature. They
must have occurred as a natural result of the competitive forces in
the free market. There is no other explanation.
Table II.84
Percent of value of shipments accounted for by the four largest companies
in each manufacturing industry: 1963 compared with 1947, 1954, and 1958:
All industries having concentration ratios of 75 percent or more in any one
of the four years.
SIC
number

Industry

Concentration Ratio
1947
1954
1958
1963

2043
2046
2072
2073
2085
2111
2141
2646
2813
2822
2892
3021
3031
3211
3275
3313
3331
3334
3411
3572
3612

Cereal preparations
79
Wet corn milling
77
Chocolate and Cocoa products
68
Chewing gum
70
Distilled liquor, except brandy
75
Cigarettes (1)
90
Tobacco stemming and redrying (1) 88
Pressed and molded pulp goods
86
Industrial gases
83
Synthetic rubber
(D)(2)
Explosives
80
Rubber footwear
81
Reclaimed rubber
84
Flat glass
(3)
Gypsum products
85
Electrometallurgical products
88
Primary copper (4)
(3)
Primary aluminum
100
Metal cans
78
Typewriters
79
Transformers
73

3633

Household laundry equipment

3624
3641
3652
84

Id.

Carbon and graphite products

87

Electric lamps

92

Phonograph records

40
79

88
75
70
86
64
82
79
72
84
53
79
72
73
90
90
77
(3)
100
80
83
78

83
73
71
89
60
79
73
69
79
60
77
65
87
92
88
73
87
(D)
80
79
71

86
71
75
90
58
80
70
72
72
57
72
62
93
94
84
79
78
(D)
74
76
68

68

71

78

86
93

70

87

92
76

83
92
69
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3661
3692
3717
3741

Telephone; telegraph apparatus (4) (3)
76
Primary batteries, dry and wet
56
Motor vehicles and parts (4)
Locomotives and parts
91

90
78
75
91

92
84
75
95

92
89
79
97

(D) Withheld to avoid disclosing figures for individual companies.
(1) Value of production shown for this industry rather than value
of shipments.
(2) At least 80 percent, since there were only five companies in

this industry in 1947.
(3) Comparable data are not available because of significant
changes in the plants or products in this industry.
(4) Value added by manufacture is shown for this industry rather
than value of shipments because the latter contains a substantial
and unmeasurable amount of duplication.
Apparently it has been widely believed that when an industry
becomes concentrated, the large firms in that industry have power
commensurate with their size, and can thereby dominate price and
production policies in the market for that line of products. By this
line of reasoning surely it would be supposed that the large firms
would use such market power to increase their respective shares of
the market.
Evidently our data indicate pretty clearly that any such theory
is fallacious. The dominant firms in the concentrated industries
have been unable to increase their dominance in most cases. The
level of concentration has not changed greatly in most cases; but
to the extent that it has, concentration ratios have gone down instead of up. More often than not the smaller firms have gained
at the expense of the larger ones, to at least a limited degree.
Evidently there are competitive forces of great strength in our
markets, sufficient in many cases to wear away the leading positions of the industrial giants.
From the foregoing it would appear that the courts have been
proceeding on the basis of serious misapprehensions as to the nature of the dominant trends in our economy. Both Justice Black
and Chief Justice Warren in their opinions have inveighed against
a "rising tide" of economic concentration. Evidently they see
themselves as obligated to battle against this supposed menace to
the free competition in our markets. Probably the same was true
of many members of Congress who supported enactment of the
Anti-Merger Act in 1950.
Since then, massive tabulations of data by the Census Bureau
for three benchmark years-1954, 1958, and 1963-have given us
much more exact data on the trends in concentration, industry
by industry, than ever before. As shown above, these data
have made it clear that no such rising tide exists.
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It seems in short that there has been a strange sort of gap
between the facts, and the cognition of those facts on the part of
the judges and others charged with interpreting and enforcing the
law. The facts are there, available to public knowledge. But a
majority of the justices have continued to harbor a mental picture
of the problem which is inconsistent with those facts.
How has it happened that this faulty picture of a rising tide
of concentration has gained such wide currency? Without doubt it
is due partly to the erroneous linkage in the public mind of a high
volume of mergers with an increase in concentration. It is true
that the number of industrial mergers in recent years has been
large. The public sees that mergers are common, and perhaps
jumps to the conclusion that market control must be passing into
fewer and fewer hands. But the consummation of a merger does
not automatically mean an increase in concentration.
To understand how this can be, let it be noted that in the oil
industry, for example, much of the new discovery of producing
structures is accomplished by independents, "wild-catters," which
then sell their discoveries to the major companies in many cases.
Thus, mergers in this industry are frequent at the producing level,
but the independents thereby gain the funds to carry on further
exploration activities for new reserves. Competition is maintained
and even enhanced by the very ease with which independent exploration companies may sell out their producing properties to the
majors.
For another example of increased competition occurring simultaneously with merger activity, look at the transportation industry.
The rapid growth of bus lines, trucking services, airlines, and
other modes of commercial transportation to say nothing of the use
of privately-owned cars has greatly broadened the extent of competition in this field which half a century ago or less was totally
dominated by the railroads. This has occurred despite a considerable amount of merger activity within the railroad field, and
among other transportation facilities also. Evidently merger activity need not mean a diminution of competition at all if new
growth is simultaneously occurring outside the merged facilities.
To return now to the trend of recent court decisions, when
judgments are handed down on the basis of faulty premises, the
results are unlikely to be salutary. In this matter of enforcing
the Anti-Merger Act, the preoccupation of the judiciary with the
supposed threat of constantly rising concentration has helped create an attitude of mind unfriendly to almost any merger. Any
excuse to say "no" seems good enough. As Justice Stewart said
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in his dissent to Von's Grocery, "the sole consistency that I can
find is that in litigation under [section] 7, the Government always
Wins."35

If one starts firmly believing in a premise that the ocean tide
is rising, then each incoming wave may seem to lend substance to
that belief. Similarly, each individual merger like each wave on
the ocean may seem to make up part of a tide of economic concentration presumably rising. But when a little time has passed and
it is seen that the level of water is no higher than it was before
after all, it becomes clear that the incoming movement of the
waves must have been counterbalanced by an unseen flow of the
waters outward. Judgment can then replace morbid fears, and
the whole movement of events can be viewed in a healthier frame
of mind.
Well, it may be asked, even if some harmless mergers are unnecessarily blocked, is any great harm done thereby? Do mergers
make any positive contribution to our social well-being anyhow?
The answer to both questions is yes. Simply put, the making of
mergers is an essential part of the flexibility of our economy. To
forbid all mergers hereafter would mean freezing in place the industrial structure of the present moment, that is, the firms that
now exist and their present roles in the business flow.
But the economy changes, and business firms must change
with it. Suppose a man who has built up a successful business
wishes to retire. Or suppose he dies. In many situations the sale
of the dominant stock holding in a corporation by its owner to a
larger corporation-in other words, a merger-is the normal mode
of making an exit from a business. Frequently it is not possible
to sell such a stock holding at all, except to a larger corporation.
In discussions of this topic, much is commonly made of the importance of "ease of entry" into an industry by outside firms, as a
means of preserving competition in that industry. But "ease of
exit" would seem to be of equal importance in a case such as this.
To mention another aspect, the merger process may be
the means by which able, agressive executives come into management control of a larger quantum of the nation's industrial assets.
If the dynamic quality of our economy is to be preserved, opportunity must be maintained for new men to rise through the ranks
into positions of industrial leadership. To block off such men from
expanding the corporations they control would be to protect the
old established industrial leadership from the challenge of the newcomers.
35 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1965).
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In short, the process of merging among businesses needs to be
viewed as occupying a necessary place in the flow of economic activity. Certainly it should be subjected to surveillance against
abuse, but it should not be treated with automatic hostility and
criticism.
Earlier a reference was made to the concept known as "overall
concentration," relating to the percentage of the total business of
the nation (or perhaps merely the total of all manufacturing) held
or controlled by a limited number of large firms-50, 100, or 200.
This concept should play no part in antitrust enforcement. In fact, it
has no real relevance to the competitive process in a direct sense.
Competition has to do with the rivalry in a particular market among
a number of buyers or sellers of a particular product or product line,
each being intent on gaining for himself a large share of the business. Competition will almost always remain vigorous whenever
such a particular market is not dominated by a very few participants.
The concept of overall concentration, however, does not concern
itself with particular markets or particular products. Although this
concept has not yet been brought into any antitrust enforcement
proceeding, it has received a good deal of attention in the literature
during the last few years. For that reason a few comments may
be of interest.
Data compiled by the Census Bureau and published by the
Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee3 6 show that in 1963,
twenty-five percent of the total value added by manufacture of the
nation was accounted for by the fifty largest companies, and fortyone percent by the 200 largest. Both figures represented increases
from a few years previously. In 1954 the fifty largest had accounted for twenty-three percent, and in 1947, for seventeen percent. However, data was also presented to the subcommittee indicating that the figure for 1947 was abnormally low, and that during the 1930's the percentage share of the fifty largest companies
was in about the same range as during the late fifties and early
sixties. If this indication is correct, it would mean that there has
been very little change in the degree of overall concentration in
over thirty years, or at most only a slight increase.
What significance should be attached to these data is hard to
say. Some have used the figures as a basis for projecting into the
future, and thereby for creating a picture of the horrifying consequences that await us in a few years, if present trends continue.
86 REPORT OF THE
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supra note 18, at 2, table 1A.
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Thus, one witness before the Subcommittee said: "At this rate of
increase, by 1975 the 200 largest corporations would control two37
thirds of the total assets of American manufacturing corporations."
But the passage of time sometimes shows such projections to be illfounded. Thus, prophets of an earlier generation, in a landmark
book published in 1935 had this to say about the shape of the
future:
Just what does this rapid growth of the big companies promise for
the future? Let us project the trend of the growth of recent years.
If the wealth of the large corporations and that of all corporations
should each continue to increase for the next 20 years at its average
annual rate for the 20 years from 1909 to 1920, 70 percent of all
corporate activity would be carried on by 200 corporations by 1950.
If the more rapid rates of growth from 1924 to 1929 were maintained for the next 20 years8 85 percent of corporate wealth would
be held by 200 huge units.
Needless to say, 1950 came and went without the country having
to experience the dire conditions foreseen by these prophets. Instead of increasing, it seems that the share of wealth owned by
those 200 largest corporations probably decreased during the period
cited in the quotation. So the use of predictions-or even of "projections" surrounded by careful caveats-must be accounted a risky
business.
Should government policy be interposed to deal with the question of a supposed increase in overall concentration? Certainly if
there has been an increase, it has been at a speed hardly exceeding
that of a glacial drift. Nor has there been any showing of the need
for such action, or of the kind of action required. As noted above,
there is no definable relationship between overall concentration
and the problems of competition in the market-place. Doubtless the
problem of overall concentration is worthy of further study, but at
this time it must be said that the topic does not appear to present the
occasion for positive government policy of any sort.

Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 519.
38 A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
40 (1935).
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